Danske indlæg afgivet i IAEA

IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 7: Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine
Statement by Denmark

Vienna, 4-8 March 2024

Thank you Chair,

1. Denmark fully aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier.

2. The IAEA continues to assess the situation at the ZNPP as very precarious with regard to nuclear safety and security. The report makes clear the risk of further degradation over time of the Plant’s safety given the serious challenges related to its staffing, maintenance of safety systems and reliability of supply chains. This is in sharp contrast to the other Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants, which the Director General reports continue to operate safely and securely despite the challenging circumstances. This contrast underlines the fundamental truth that it is the illegal Russian seizure of the ZNPP, two years ago this week, which has created the precarious situation described in the report. A situation that poses an unacceptable risk of grave consequences not only in Ukraine and the surrounding countries, but globally.

3. Let me also take this opportunity to express our serious concern regarding possible plans to restart reactors at the ZNPP. This would be a highly irresponsible act.

Chair, 

4. We continue to demand that Russia comply with international law and the calls of this Board and the General Conference. It must reverse its invasion by fully withdrawing its forces, other personnel and all military equipment from the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the entire territory of Ukraine. We fully reject Russia’s claims of ownership of the ZNPP. Russia flooding us with notes to the contrary does not affect Ukraine’s legitimate rights.

5. Denmark fully supports the Agency’s efforts to help ensure nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, at the request of the Ukrainian authorities. We have made a voluntary financial contribution to this work, and we are grateful for the Agency’s determined implementation of a programme of assistance for Ukraine, including its sustained presence at the country’s nuclear sites. 

6. However, to reap the full benefit of the IAEA’s presence, it is essential that the Mission has unhindered access at the plant and to the people working there. Otherwise, the Agency will be unable to provide its valuable reporting to the international community on a fully informed basis. We are concerned that the Director General still has to stress the importance of providing the Agency’s staff with timely access and information relevant to nuclear safety and security in order to monitor observance of the five concrete principles and assess the Seven Pillars. It is particularly concerning to read that access is being prevented to areas at the ZNPP guarded by armed troops. 

Chair,

7. Despite these difficult circumstances, we are pleased that the Agency has been able to continue its safeguards work in accordance with Ukraine’s safeguards agreement and the established plans. We welcome the finding that there are no indications that would give rise to proliferation concerns.

8. In closing, I reiterate my country’s full and unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. We also support the draft resolution tabled by Ukraine and urge Russia to comply with it without further delay.

Thank you, Chair

 

IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 6c: NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran
Statement by Denmark

Vienna, 4-8 March 2024

 

1. Denmark fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union.

Chair,

2. There is very little I can add to the points my delegation has repeatedly made in this body over several years now.
This is because the situation is essentially unchanged. We may have seen some ups and downs in Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA – or at least its desire to be seen to do so. But fundamentally, we see no progress. We continue to face a situation in which a country producing and stockpiling vast amounts of nuclear material for purposes, which are at best nebulous, refuses to provide the IAEA and its – remaining! - inspectors with the means to draw sound conclusions about the nature of its nuclear programme. 

3. Despite repeated calls by this Board on Iran to strengthen its cooperation with the IAEA, and so comply with its safeguards obligations, this conclusion remains unchanged. In fact, the Director General has now made clear that one of Iran’s unilateral decisions to reduce its cooperation is contrary to legal obligations contained in its Safeguards Agreement.

Chair,

4. This situation risks undermining confidence in the safeguards system and, by implication, in the NPT. This cannot be in any of our interests. Let me underline that no criticism of the IAEA and its diligent inspectors is implied. We fully and unequivocally support their professional and impartial work. But without Iranian cooperation and compliance, they are hampered in their tasks to an unacceptable degree. As the Director General points out, Iranian signals regarding a technical capability to produce nuclear weapons only serves to increase existing concerns.

5. I will not repeat each of the aspects I and many others have raised many times before. Let me simply underline, once again, our strong call on Iran to comply with its safeguards obligations and all relevant Board resolutions and to cooperate with the IAEA as required without further delay.

Thank you Chair.

 

IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)
Statement by Denmark

Vienna, 4-8 March 2024

 

Thank you Chair,

1. Denmark fully aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier.

2. Once again the Board has before it a report which details an escalating and highly proliferation-sensitive Iranian nuclear programme. The fact that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium has been reduced does not change this description. A reduction due to downblending does not affect Iran’s capacity to replenish its stockpile. In fact, we have seen a significant increase in Iran’s production of Highly Enriched Uranium during this reporting period. Iran’s enrichment-related infrastructure, including the number of centrifuges installed, also continues to grow, despite the absence of any plausible civilian purpose.

3. In the light of the magnitude of Iran’s nuclear activities, we are strongly concerned that Iran has, for three years, denied to the IAEA the monitoring and verification capabilities foreseen in the JCPoA. Iran’s decision to withdraw the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors only serves to increase our concerns as regards the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively. We are disappointed that the announced Iranian exploration of possibilities to address this issue have not borne fruit and note that the Director General describes a reversal of the de-designation decisions as essential for effective verification. 

Chair,

4. The report makes clear that the IAEA has irretrievably lost continuity of knowledge as regards several aspects of Iran’s activities, including its production and inventory of centrifuges. This further complicates any potential return to the full implementation of the JCPoA. We strongly regret this.

5. I wish to reiterate Denmark’s strong support for the IAEA and its professional and impartial work to monitor and verify the implementation of the JCPoA as well as Iran’s safeguards obligations. Iran’s decisions, however, limit the effectiveness of this work. We therefore, once again, strongly urge Iran to resume full implementation of its nuclear commitments, including all transparency measures, among which is the Additional Protocol. It is crucial that the IAEA be enabled to take all verification measures it deems necessary given the extent and expanding character of Iran’s nuclear programme. 

6. We look forward to the Director General’s continued detailed reporting. These reports are crucial to provide the international community with assurances about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Such assurances require the full implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, including the legally binding modified Code 3.1, and full cooperation with the IAEA. 

Thank you, Chair

 

IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 3: 
Nuclear security: Nuclear Security Review 2024 
Statement by Denmark

Vienna, 4-8 March 2024

Thank you Chair,
Denmark fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the EU. Allow me to make three short additional points in my national capacity:

Firstly, the Agency’s work and central coordinating role in Nuclear Security is a priority for us. Guidance and support offered to Member States play an important role in ensuring that we can make full use of nuclear technology, including for attaining the Sustainable Development Goals. Given the risks and challenges associated with nuclear energy, it is crucial that the exploitation of its potential be accompanied by robust nuclear and radiological security measures. In addition, as the Review makes clear, the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has further highlighted the importance of maintaining nuclear security also during armed conflict. For these reasons, my government is pleased to contribute financially to both the Nuclear Security Fund and the IAEA’s activities in Ukraine. We look forward to the upcoming ICONS as an opportunity for all Member States to confirm their support for nuclear security and the Agency’s work in this field.

Secondly, the Agency’s work on nuclear security continues to be reliant on voluntary contributions, in our view overly so. The fact that expenditure was higher than revenue in 2022 and 2023 indicates the unpredictable nature of the NSF. We welcome the Secretariat’s work to engage with donors in order to better align contributions to programmatic areas requiring funding. Denmark’s contributions to the NSF remain flexible and multi-year to support these efforts. Nonetheless, increasing funds from the Regular Budget would be more sustainable and predictable. We note with satisfaction that the Agency has further strengthened the results-based approach in its planning, implementation and monitoring, and performance assessment.

Thirdly, as a donor to the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre, we welcome the successful beginning of its operations. We note that the running of the Centre will require substantial resources every year, all from voluntary contributions. We hope that the training activities to be conducted will help further increase the share of women among the participants in Agency training events. The current figure of around one quarter shows the need for a continued focus on this goal. 

Thank you, Chair 

 

 

Statement by Denmark: Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine

 

Statement by Denmark: NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Vienna, 22 - 24 November 2023

You can read the statement here

 

Statement by Denmark: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

Vienna, 22 - 24 November 2023

You can read the statement here

 

Statement by Denmark at the IAEA General Conference

Vienna, 25 – 29 September 2023

You can read the statement here 

 

Joint Statement on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

IAEA Board of Governors
September 2023

Thank you Chair.

I am delivering this statement on behalf of a group of 63 member states from all regional groups including all EU member states.

These 63 states are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, and Yemen.

We express our sincere appreciation for the continued professional and impartial efforts of the Agency to implement Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We commend the Director General for his extensive efforts to engage Iran regarding the outstanding safeguards issues and implementation of further verification and monitoring activities by the Agency. We note that the Director General has further reiterated that the outstanding safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We echo the Director General’s request that Iran work with the Agency in earnest and in a sustained way towards the fulfilment of the commitments contained in the March 4 Joint Statement.

Recalling this Board’s resolution contained in GOV/2022/70, which was adopted on 17 November 2022, we collectively highlight the contents of the Director General’s latest report contained in GOV/2023/43. This report concludes once again that the safeguards issues related to possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran remain outstanding due to insufficient cooperation by Iran, and moreover that new issues related to Iran’s implementation of its NPT-required safeguards agreement have arisen. In addition, despite signs in June that Iran was making limited progress towards implementation of the Joint Statement with the IAEA, we share the Director General’s regret that no progress has been made since. Iran’s de-designation of experienced Agency inspectors and denials of visas for Agency officials run counter to the Joint Statement and undermine the Agency’s ability to carry out its safeguards mandate.

We reiterate that the Board has adopted three resolutions on safeguards issues over four years as a result of the Agency’s calls for better co-operation by Iran. We recall that the resolution adopted last November by the Board of Governors decided it was and it is essential and urgent that Iran act to fulfill its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues, take the following actions without delay:

1. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at three undeclared locations in Iran;
2. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment;
3. Provide all information, documentation, and answers the Agency requires for that purpose; and
4. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.

We note that over the past ten months Iran still has not provided technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin found by the Agency at undeclared locations in Iran. We underline that the Director General has reported once again that “the outstanding safeguards issues[…] need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful”. Collectively, we underscore the urgent need for Iran to clarify and resolve these issues in a manner satisfactory to the IAEA. Iran must provide technically credible answers to the IAEA, as required by its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in order to address the Agency’s legitimate questions on the outstanding locations, and to resolve the nuclear material discrepancy relating to its Uranium Conversion Facility. As noted in the Board’s November Resolution, when the Secretariat is in a position to report the safeguards issues as no longer outstanding as a result of Iran’s provision of technically credible information, it would remove the need for the Board’s consideration and action on these issues.
In addition, like all other states with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and as the Director General’s report notes, Iran’s implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Iran therefore is obligated to provide design information as soon as the decision is made to construct, or authorize construction of, a nuclear facility. Iran must provide the required information regarding new nuclear facilities without further delay. This is essential to ensure not only the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, but also the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system on which we all rely for the nonproliferation assurance that is key to international security.

We call upon Iran to act immediately to fulfil its legal obligations to address the following issues identified by the Director General:

1. The outstanding safeguards issues in relation to nuclear material detected at undeclared locations in Iran, including informing the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or contaminated equipment;
2. The discrepancy in the amount of nuclear material verified by the Agency at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (originating from the Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories), compared to the amount declared by Iran; and
3. Iran’s implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, including the provision of the required early design information.

We would like to thank the IAEA for its impartial and professional work on this issue. We request the Director General to continue to report to the Board of Governors on this issue.

 

Statement by Denmark on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 11 - 15 September 2023

Thank you Chair

1. Denmark is fully aligned with the EU statement delivered yesterday.

2. For a year now, the IAEA has been present at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, at the request of the rightful Ukrainian authorities. We are grateful for and fully supportive of the Agency’s efforts to help ensure nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. A nuclear accident would not only have grave consequences in Ukraine and the surrounding countries, but would also have severe global repercussions.

3. Let us be clear: these risks result from Russia’s illegal seizure of the plant and from its unjustified war of aggression on a sovereign neighbouring country. These are the reasons that all seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict continue to be compromised. These are the reasons for the highly precarious situation reported by the Director General.

4. Therefore, the way to end the current threat to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine is quite straightforward: Russia must comply with international law and the calls of this Board and reverse its invasion by fully withdrawing its forces, other personnel and all military equipment from the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the entire territory of Ukraine thereby ending its illegal war. 

Chair

5. The Director General has repeatedly stressed the need for full and timely IAEA access to all locations at the Plant. We are concerned that the IAEA experts have not been allowed to access certain reactor rooftops or turbine halls, preventing the IAEA from fully assessing, at one time, the possible presence of items in contravention of the five principles the DG established in May. We strongly support the calls for the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission team to be enabled to carry out its functions unhindered. This is the basis for the valuable information that the IAEA provides to the international community. 

6. We look forward to the Director General continuing to keep the Board of Governors informed of the situation and of the IAEA’s continuous observations.

7. Let me once again express our gratitude and support both to the personnel in Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, especially the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, who work under such enormous pressure, and to the IAEA teams who support them on the ground. We also thank the IAEA for its safeguards work in accordance with the established plans and welcome the finding that there are no indications that would give rise to proliferation concerns. 

8. After listening yesterday to a very long statement, I cannot end without reiterating my country’s full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

Thank you, Chair

Statement by Denmark on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 11 - 15 September 2023

Thank you Chair,

1. Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier.

2. Once again the Board has before it a report, which details an escalating and highly proliferation-sensitive Iranian nuclear programme. Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, including highly enriched uranium continue to grow as does its enrichment capacity, despite the absence of any plausible civilian purpose.

3. It is all the more concerning that Iran continues to deny to the IAEA the monitoring and verification capabilities foreseen in the JCPoA. Moreover, this is occurring at a time when the Agency is unable to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

4. The report makes clear that the IAEA has irretrievably lost continuity of knowledge as regards several aspects of Iran’s activities and that any attempt to establish a new baseline would be very challenging and involve significant uncertainty. This further complicates any potential return to the full implementation of the JCPoA. We strongly regret this. 

5. We therefore once again - as in previous board meetings – strongly urge Iran to cooperate with the Agency and enable it to conduct all verification necessary in light of the magnitude of Iran’s nuclear activity. This includes allowing the Agency to install surveillance and monitoring equipment as requested and providing access to the resulting data. It should also include allowing the Agency to deploy its most skilled and experienced inspectors and providing visa to Agency staff.

6. I wish to reiterate Denmark’s strong support for the IAEA and its professional and impartial work to monitor and verify the implementation of the JCPoA as well as Iran’s safeguards obligations. Iran’s decisions, however, limit the effectiveness of this work. We therefore, once again, strongly urge Iran to resume full implementation of its nuclear commitments, including all transparency measures, among which is the Additional Protocol, as well as the agreements reflected in the March Joint Statement. 

7. We look forward to the Director General’s continued detailed reporting. These reports are crucial to provide the international community with assurances about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Such assurances, however, require the full implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, including modified Code 3.1, and full cooperation with the IAEA. 

Thank you, Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 11 - 15 September 2023

Thank you Chair,

 

1. Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered under this agenda item as well as with the statement delivered on behalf of a broad group of 63 countries. Therefore I will be brief.
   
   
2. Denmark shares the regret expressed by the Director General that there has been no progress either in resolving longstanding safeguards issues or in advancing the implementation of the March Joint Statement.
   
   
3. This lack of progress means that our strong concern with Iran’s failure to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles at undeclared locations and the Agency’s ensuing inability to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement declarations is unabated. More than four years and many board meetingsafter the emergence of these issues, they remain unresolved.
   
   
4. Let us be clear: The outstanding issues stem from Iran’s legally binding obligations. For the sake of the international non-proliferation regime, all states must fulfil their safeguards obligations. For a country producing and accumulating large quantities of highly enriched uranium, moreover without a credible civilian purpose, not to do so is of particular concern.
   
   
5. Moreover, modified Code 3.1 also constitutes a legal obligation, and no country can simply choose to unilaterally suspend it.
   
   
6. New developments highlighted in the current report add to our concerns. The de-designation of experienced inspectors makes it more difficult for the IAEA to implement its safeguards mandate. Equally, not issuing visas to Agency staff sends a worrying signal about Iran’s true intentions when it comes to cooperating with the Agency.
   Chair
7. The Board’s most recent resolution was adopted last November, 10 months ago. Yet it is clear from the report that Iran has failed to take the steps necessary to implement that resolution. Once again, Denmark urges Iran to comply fully and without further delay with its obligations and to cooperate in good faith with the Agency in the implementation of the commitments contained in the Joint Statement. Iran has already worn the patience of the international community very thin.. It would be crucial for Iran to contribute to building confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities by providing the Agency with the access, the information and the cooperation necessary for the Agency to draw a conclusion in this regard.
   
   
8. Let me end by commending the IAEA, the Director General and the Safeguards Department for their continued professional and impartial efforts to implement safeguards in Iran in line with standard practise. We fully support them and look forward to their continued reporting.

  

Thank you Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 5 – 9 June 2023

Chair,

1. Denmark is fully aligned with the EU statement delivered earlier.
   
   
2. The situation regarding nuclear safety and security in Ukraine remains of grave concern as a result of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of a sovereign neighbouring country. All seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict continue to be compromised at all times, as the Director General’s report shows.
   
   
3. In this precarious situation, we welcome and support the establishment of the five IAEA principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and we thank the Director General and the IAEA for their tireless efforts leading up to this point.
   
   
4. The IAEA will monitor the implementation of these principles, and the Support and Assistance Mission team should be fully enabled to do so, having access to all areas of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. We expect and look forward to the Director General keeping the Board of Governors informed of the situation and of the IAEA’s continuous observations.
   
   
5. The horrifying destruction of the Kakhovka Dam underlines once again the need for protecting structures essential to the safe operation of ZNPP from attacks, in line with the IAEA principles. We reiterate our condemnation of attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
   
   
6. Let me once again express our gratitude and support both to the personnel in Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, especially the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, who work under such enormous pressure, and to the IAEA teams who support them on the ground. We also thank the IAEA for its safeguards work in accordance with the established plans and welcome the finding that there are no indications that would give rise to proliferation concerns.
   
   
7. The way to end the current threat to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine is simple: Russia must comply with international law and the calls of the Board and reverse its invasion by fully withdrawing its forces, other personnel and all military equipment from the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the entire territory of Ukraine thereby ending its illegal war.
   
   
8. I cannot end without reiterating my country’s full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

Thank you, Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran 

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 5 – 9 June 2023

Chair,

 

1. Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered under this agenda item.
2. We have long expressed our strong concern with Iran’s failure to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles at several undeclared locations and the Agency’s ensuing inability to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement declarations. Despite the steps reported in the Director General’s current report, this situation remains essentially unchanged. Our concern therefore is undiminished.
3. We had hoped that the Joint Statement agreed in March would lead to swift progress in addressing the open issues, including those listed in the Board’s November 2022 resolution. Yet the report makes clear that the Agency is still awaiting Iran’s engagement to address key issues.
   
   
4. The outstanding issues stem from Iran’s legally binding obligations. For the sake of the international non-proliferation regime, all states must fulfil their safeguards obligations. For a country producing and accumulating large quantities of highly enriched uranium, moreover without a credible civilian purpose, not to do so is of particular concern.

    

5. The Board has demonstrated a great deal of patience in the matter of Iran implementing its safeguards obligations. Denmark urges Iran to, without delay, comply fully with these obligations and to cooperate in good faith with the Agency in the implementation of the Joint Statement, so as to not further test the international community’s patience. Instead it would be crucial for Iran to contribute to building confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities by providing the Agency with the access, the information and the cooperation necessary for the Agency to draw a conclusion in this regard.

    

6. Let me end by commending the IAEA, the Director General and the Safeguards Department for their continued professional efforts to implement safeguards in Iran in line with standard practise. We fully support them and look forward to their continued reporting.

  

Thank you Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) 

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 5– 9 June 2023

Chair,

 

1. Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier. 

    

2. The report before us paints a truly grim picture of the consequences of Iran’s continuing failure to implement the JCPoA. We are seeing stockpiles of enriched uranium, including highly enriched uranium, growing to unprecedented sizes without any plausible civilian need. Regardless of the calls of this Board and the international community more broadly, Iran has continued its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities while also continuing to deny to the IAEA the monitoring and verification capabilities foreseen in the JCPoA.

    

3. The report also makes clear that the IAEA has irretrievably lost continuity of knowledge as regards several aspects of Iran’s activities and that any attempt to establish a new baseline would be very challenging and involve significant uncertainty. This further complicates any potential return to the full implementation of the JCPoA, even should Iran return to its commitments. We strongly regret this.

    

4. The Agency’s lack of a satisfactory understanding of Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuge components is of particular concern. We acknowledge the reinstallation of IAEA cameras at one set of workshops in Esfahan, but without Agency access to recordings, this has limited practical value. We therefore call on Iran to urgently come to an understanding with the Agency on the provision of these data as well as those collected previously.

    

5. I wish to reiterate our strong support for the IAEA and its professional and impartial work to monitor and verify the implementation of the JCPoA as well as Iran’s safeguards obligations. Iran’s decisions, however, limits the effectiveness of this work. We therefore strongly urge Iran to resume full implementation of its nuclear commitments, including all transparency measures, among which is the Additional Protocol, as well as the agreements reflected in the March Joint Statement.

    

6. We look forward to the Director General’s continued detailed reporting. These reports are crucial to provide the international community with assurances about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Such assurances, however, require the full implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, including the modified Code 3.1, and full cooperation with the IAEA. 

Thank you, Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on Nuclear security: Nuclear Security Review 2023

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 6 - 10 March 2023

1. Denmark fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the EU. Allow me to make three short additional points in my national capacity:
   
   
2. Firstly, Denmark continues to attach strong importance to the Agency’s activities in the field of nuclear security, because we consider the guidance and support offered to member states as a central contribution to making full use of the potential of nuclear technology. The implications of Russia’s deplorable attacks on relevant Ukrainian infrastructure have further underlined this point. In general, the risks and challenges involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear applications make it crucial to have them accompanied by robust nuclear and radiological security measures in order to maintain human security. For this reason, we are pleased to be a regular contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund and aim to make our contributions as flexible as possible by avoiding earmarking.
   
   
3. Secondly, we welcome the progress made in the establishment of the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre, which is to complement existing training opportunities. We note that the running of the Centre will require substantial resources every year, all from voluntary contributions. It is important that the “Programme Support Costs” attached to those contributions be made available, as far as possible, to the operation of the Centre.
   
   
4. Thirdly, it remains our position that the Agency’s nuclear security work is overly reliant on voluntary funding. While we encourage contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund, we continue to call for the allocation of more Regular Budget funding to this work. The high demand by Member States for assistance reflected in the Review underlines the need for sustainable funding.

Thank you, Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 6 - 10 March 2023

Chair,

 

Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered under this agenda item.

 

We have long expressed our strong concern with Iran’s failure to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles at several undeclared locations and the Agency’s ensuing inability to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement declarations. By the end of February, no progress had been made despite the repeated strong call by the Board on Iran. Today, I want to express our admiration for the tenacity and patience demonstrated by the Director General during this long process. We very much hope that the agreement reached in Tehran regarding further access and information to be provided to the Agency by Iran in order to address the outstanding safeguards issues will finally bear fruit without further delay.

 

Chair, since our last meeting, new issues have arisen with regard to Iran’s implementation of its legally binding safeguards obligations. The DG has reported that Iran has acted in a way contrary to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement  by implementing a significant change to the declared design information for the Fordow Plant without informing the Agency in advance. Also, particles of highly enriched uranium at an alarmingly high level have been found, again without that enrichment level having been declared. For the sake of the international non-proliferation regime, all states must fulfil their safeguards obligations. For a country producing and accumulating large quantities of highly enriched uranium, moreover without a credible civilian purpose, not to do so is particularly concerning.

 

The Board, like the DG, has displayed a high level of patience and is continuing to do so. We urge Iran now to comply fully with its safeguards obligations and to cooperate in good faith with the Agency, so as to not further test the international community’s patience.

 

Let me end by commending the IAEA, the Director General and the Safeguards Department for their continued professional efforts to implement safeguards in Iran in line with standard practise. We fully support them and look forward to their continued reporting.

 

 

Thank you Chair

 

 

Statement by Denmark on Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 6 - 10 March 2023

 

Chair,

 

Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier. 

 

As that statement makes clear, we are faced with a truly alarming situation. Regardless of the calls of this Board and the international community more broadly, Iran has continued to escalate its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities to an unprecedented level. It is doing so while continuing to deny to the IAEA the monitoring and verification capabilities foreseen in the JCPoA. Moreover, Iran has also implemented a significant change to the declared design information for FFEP without informing the Agency in advance, which is contrary to its legally binding Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement obligations.

 

This is happening in a country, which is producing and accumulating highly enriched uranium in sharply increasing amounts and without any plausible need. The fact that the IAEA has now found particles of uranium enriched to an even much higher level – 83.7% - only adds to existing grave concerns. 

 

These developments along with the fact that the IAEA has now irretrievably lost continuity of knowledge as regards several aspects of Iran’s activities further complicate a return to the full implementation of the JCPoA. We deeply regret this. A package allowing a full return to the JCPoA had been put on the table by the Joint Commission Coordinator, but Iran has chosen not to seize this opportunity. 

 

We hope that the agreement reached in Teheran regarding reinstallation of IAEA monitoring equipment will put the Agency in a better position as regards  establishing a satisfactory new baseline for JCPoA verification activities, should Iran resume implementation of its commitments.

 

I wish to reiterate our strong support for the IAEA and its work to monitor and verify the implementation of the JCPoA as well as Iran’s safeguards obligations. Iran’s decisions, however, put the effectiveness of this work at risk. We therefore strongly urge Iran to resume full implementation of its nuclear commitments, including all transparency measures, among which is the Additional Protocol, as well as the agreements reflected in the recent Joint Statement.

 

We look forward to the Director General’s continued detailed reporting. These reports are crucial to provide the international community with assurances about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Such assurances, however, require the full implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, including the modified Code 3.1, and of the verification and monitoring activities contained in the JCPoA. 

 

 

Thank you, Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 6 - 10 March 2023

1. Denmark is fully aligned with the EU statement as well as the statement delivered by Canada on our behalf.

    

2. One year ago, following Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of a sovereign neighbouring country, the Board of Governors adopted its first resolution on Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. In the resolution, the Board, among other things, called on Russia to immediately cease all actions against nuclear facilities in Ukraine, in order for the competent Ukrainian authorities to preserve or promptly regain full control over all nuclear facilities within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and ensure their safe and secure operations.

               

3. The Board has since adopted two further resolutions reiterating this call. Perhaps we should not be surprised that Russia, whose leadership continues to show such disregard for international law, has ignored the Board’s calls.

    

4. However, we have every reason to be gravely concerned by this state of affairs, as the IAEA has found that the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine is increasingly precarious, challenging and potentially dangerous.

    

5. The way to rectify this is for Russia to comply with international law and with the Board’s calls and reverse its invasion by fully withdrawing its forces from Ukraine and end its illegal war.

    

6. Meanwhile, we extend our gratitude and full support both to the personnel in Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, especially the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, who work under such enormous pressure, and to the IAEA teams who support them on the ground.

    

7. We also thank the Director General and all the IAEA staff, including in the Incident and Emergency Centre, who put in a tremendous effort to help maintain nuclear safety and security in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. We recall the recommendations previously put forward by the IAEA, including as regards a “ZNPP Nuclear Safety and Security Protection Zone” and support every effort to avoid the continued challenges to the Seven Pillars.

    

8. Equally, we thank the IAEA for its safeguards work in accordance with the established plans and welcome the finding that there are no indications that would give rise to proliferation concerns, nor of activities related to “dirty bombs”.

    

9. I cannot end without reiterating my country’s full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

 

Thank you, Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 16 - 18 November 2022

 

Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered under this agenda item.

Once again, the Report before us is very clear. The IAEA is not in a position to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s CSA declarations, because Iran has continued not to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles at several undeclared locations. The current location of the nuclear material and equipment involved remains unknown.

It is a core element of the international safeguards system that states must cooperate with the IAEA. In the absence of sufficient cooperation in line with the legal obligations states have entered into, the Agency is unable to implement its safeguards mandate and draw the relevant conclusions. For this reason, lack of proper cooperation is a concern to all Member States, and the Board cannot ignore such a challenge to the system that we all rely on.

The continued lack of substantive Iranian engagement to solve issues stemming from its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is therefore particularly concerning. We commend the Director General and the Safeguards Department for their dedicated and tireless work over several years to resolve outstanding questions in line with standard safeguards practise, and we fully support them in fulfilling their safeguards mandate. Despite these efforts, the IAEA cannot progress without Iranian engagement. We regret therefore that Iran did not take the opportunity provided by discussions held in September and November to effectively clarify and resolve outstanding issues.

While we regret that it has become necessary for the Board to take action, yet again, to ensure that Iran meets its legal obligations, we fully support the draft resolution submitted to this meeting. We strongly hope that it will be implemented, leading to significant progress before the Board’s meeting in March 2023, and preferably well before then.

Finally, we reiterate that failure to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements is contrary to Iran’s legal obligations.

Thank you Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 16 – 18 November 2022

Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered under this agenda item.

Once again, the Report before us is very clear. The IAEA is not in a position to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s CSA declarations, because Iran has continued not to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles at several undeclared locations. The current location of the nuclear material and equipment involved remains unknown.

It is a core element of the international safeguards system that states must cooperate with the IAEA. In the absence of sufficient cooperation in line with the legal obligations states have entered into, the Agency is unable to implement its safeguards mandate and draw the relevant conclusions. For this reason, lack of proper cooperation is a concern to all Member States, and the Board cannot ignore such a challenge to the system that we all rely on.

The continued lack of substantive Iranian engagement to solve issues stemming from its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is therefore particularly concerning. We commend the Director General and the Safeguards Department for their dedicated and tireless work over several years to resolve outstanding questions in line with standard safeguards practise, and we fully support them in fulfilling their safeguards mandate. Despite these efforts, the IAEA cannot progress without Iranian engagement. We regret therefore that Iran did not take the opportunity provided by discussions held in September and November to effectively clarify and resolve outstanding issues.

While we regret that it has become necessary for the Board to take action, yet again, to ensure that Iran meets its legal obligations, we fully support the draft resolution submitted to this meeting. We strongly hope that it will be implemented, leading to significant progress before the Board’s meeting in March 2023, and preferably well before then.

Finally, we reiterate that failure to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements is contrary to Iran’s legal obligations.

Thank you Chair

 

Statement by Denmark on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 16 – 18 November 2022
You can read the statement here

 

Statement by Denmark on the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 16 – 18 November 2022
You can read the statement here

 

Statement by Denmark at General Conference

Vienna, 26 – 30 September 2022

You can read the statement here