Statement by Denmark on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 16 - 18 November 2022

Below you can read the statement by Denmark on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

 

Denmark aligns itself with the EU statement delivered earlier.

During previous meetings, we expressed hope for a swift return to the JCPoA and its full implementation. We are disappointed that no real progress has been observed. We continue to believe that the JCPoA has clear non-proliferation benefits if fully implemented and verified. For this reason, we continue to support the unwavering efforts to achieve this goal, and we call on Iran to conclude an agreement based on the package put on the table by the Joint Commission Coordinator. 

Meanwhile, we are deeply concerned by Iran’s significant and escalating proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in violation of the JCPoA, including the accumulation of highly enriched uranium and the expansion of its enrichment capacity. The consequences of Iran’s decision almost two years ago to stop the implementation of commitments related to IAEA access and oversight are growing. 

We are concerned to learn that any future baseline for the above-mentioned JCPOA verification and monitoring activities would take a considerable time to establish and would have a degree of uncertainty. 

Taken together, Iran’s decisions put the proliferation benefits as well as the IAEA’s effective monitoring and verification at severe risk. We therefore strongly urge Iran to resume full implementation of the JCPoA, including all transparency measures, among which is the Additional Protocol.

We have full confidence in the IAEA’s safeguards work, which is particularly important given that Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon state to enrich to a level of 60% and is accumulating large amounts of enriched uranium.

We look forward to the Director General’s continued detailed reporting. These reports are crucial to provide the international community with assurances about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Such assurances, however, require the full implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, including the modified Code 3.1, and of the verification and monitoring activities contained in the JCPoA. 


Thank you, Chair